Department 13: Anatomy of DJI drone identification

[UAVNV]

This white paper examines several nuances in DJI technology implementation

https://department13.com/dev/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Anatomy-of-DJI-Drone-ID-Implementation1.pdf

website:
Home - Department 13

 

[Slim.slamma]

Based on information obtained via disassembly done in private by Freek van Tienen, there appears to be a “private mode” in the DJI flight controller settings. This mode allows for one of the following four options:
• Option 1: Disable the sending of state information in the `flight_info` • Option 2: Disable the sending of a home location
• Option 3: Hide drone ID in the flight purpose packet
• Option 4: Send “fake" instead of a real serial number

 

[Slim.slamma]

“In theory it is sort of like if you are speeding in a car, if someone is there to see you speed, they can catch you and pull you over, if you are speeding in the middle of the country, and no one catches you, I guess that is not a bad thing, you haven’t hurt anyone, why do you need to be tracked for that?” 39

 

[Slim.slamma]

Police Department has suspended their use of license plate scanners for now. It seems the optical character recognition technology was working just fine, but the department wasn’t following up on all of the hot crime fighting leads the technology was generating." At one point Boston also had to discontinue using its ALPR because of a leak to the media that was not redacted “revealing full plate numbers and GPS location data for more than 40,000 different vehicles, most of which belonged to private citizens.” 41 The struggle with license plate privacy should not be taken lightly, especially when used as a comparison for Drone ID.

 

[Chip]

Police Department has suspended their use of license plate scanners for now. It seems the optical character recognition technology was working just fine, but the department wasn’t following up on all of the hot crime fighting leads the technology was generating." At one point Boston also had to discontinue using its ALPR because of a leak to the media that was not redacted “revealing full plate numbers and GPS location data for more than 40,000 different vehicles, most of which belonged to private citizens.” 41 The struggle with license plate privacy should not be taken lightly, especially when used as a comparison for Drone ID.

Very interesting and excellent points. Many people liken Aeroscope to a license plate reader perhaps not knowing that ALPRs are often highly regulated by the states.

 

[Steve F]

The feds are more likely to use something more generic than Aeroscope. There are other companies providing solutions for drone detection and interdiction. This one marketed by TCI here claims in their marketing release to have been purchased by multiple US government agencies:
Combating the Modern Drone Threat | TCI Drone Detection Systems
This type of solution allows to rapidly home in on the drone and operators location and send out a text alert to the enforcement team, and is not limited to just one specific drone manufacturer.
But they are probably more interested in more exposed threats to public safety (e.g. large events), border security, and enforcing airspace restrictions with more active air traffic.

 

[Chip]

The feds are more likely to use something more generic than Aeroscope. There are other companies providing solutions for drone detection and interdiction. This one marketed by TCI here claims in their marketing release to have been purchased by multiple US government agencies:
Combating the Modern Drone Threat | TCI Drone Detection Systems
This type of solution allows to rapidly home in on the drone and operators location and send out a text alert to the enforcement team, and is not limited to just one specific drone manufacturer.
But they are probably more interested in more exposed threats to public safety (e.g. large events), border security, and enforcing airspace restrictions with more active air traffic.

So, TCI presumes to have the right to intercept any radio signal emitted by a drone and relay all data obtained to law enforcement with no laws, rules, regulations or search warrants in place? This takes huge gumption given the various federal and state Constitutions and laws which cover such things as privacy, electronic eavesdropping, location tracking, search and seizure etc.

 

[Steve F]

So, TCI presumes to have the right to intercept any radio signal emitted by a drone and relay all data obtained to law enforcement with no laws, rules, regulations or search warrants in place? This takes huge gumption given the various federal and state Constitutions and laws which cover such things as privacy, electronic eavesdropping, location tracking, search and seizure etc.

They are just providing the equipment. It is up to the purchaser to decide what to do. In this case the equipment is capable of getting a position fix, but not necessary intercept or decipher the content of the signal between the drone and its operator. Receiving a signal broadcast over the public airwaves is not illegal. Only if it is encrypted and the intercepting party tries to decrypt it without authorization that could be construed as illegal. Otherwise I don't view this any different than the use of a radio scanner for following air traffic.

 

[Chip]

... Receiving a signal broadcast over the public airwaves is not illegal. Only if it is encrypted and the intercepting party tries to decrypt it without authorization that could be construed as illegal. Otherwise I don't view this any different than the use of a radio scanner for following air traffic.

Okay, I follow you, but I am resistant to the idea that any unencyrpted radio signal or electronic communication may be intercepted by anyone with impunity regardless of fact or circumstance. I think different courts have drawn different conclusions. They have also differed on whether an unencrypted wi-fi signal is a radio signal or an electronic communication which can make big difference in interpretation and enforcement of electronic eavesdropping laws. This is where the Google wireless sniffer case fits in. Google assumed if wireless signal was unencrypted then they could intercept it which turned out not to be true, at least not in 9th circuit (Alaska, Arizona, WA, Oregon, CA, Idaho, Montana and Nevada).

Excerpt from article linked below:

Between 2007 and 2010, Google equipped its Street View cars with Wi-Fi antennas and software that collected data transmitted by Wi-Fi networks in nearby homes and businesses, which included both network identifying information and so-called payload data transmitted over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks. The company acknowledged in May 2010 that it had inadvertently collected some personal data from unencrypted networks and apologized for it. The company also settled for $7 million with 37 U.S. states and the District of Columbia over its unauthorized collection of personal data transmitted over Wi-Fi networks. The story from WIRED is linked below.

An Intentional Mistake: The Anatomy of Google's Wi-Fi Sniffing Debacle

 

[Chip]

More about the case:

Joffe v Google Inc. 746 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2013)

FindLaw's United States Ninth Circuit case and opinions.

Despite Google's public apology, multiple people brought suit under federal and state law, including the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Google argued that its data collection did not violate the Act because data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network is an " electronic communication" that is " readily accessible to the general public" and exempt under the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). The district court rejected Google's argument. So did the Ninth Circuit of Appeals and the US Supreme Court declined review.