Would you support a lawsuit over Remote ID?

[anotherlab]

The ship has certainly left the harbor. But, would you at least grant with a visible list and a long journey ahead?

I would say "a visible list" is wishful thinking, but yes on the length of the journey.

 

[Chip]

I would say "a visible list" is wishful thinking, but yes on the length of the journey.

I thought I was pushing it with you a little but had to try!

 

[Chip]

If DHS ordered FAA to require public broadcast of unencrypted signal, then I would like to know why and under whose authority?

I thought it might be related to warnings contained in the August 2020 Inter-agency Advisory that Brett found warning the public and government agencies that drone tracking or interception of signal may violate federal wiretapping law. The Advisory is linked below:

https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-366222A1.pdf

Well, here is a quote straight from the horse's mouth:

An example of a currently illegal, but highly effective technology is the ability to access signals being transmitted between a nefarious UAS and its ground controller to accurately geolocate and track both without false alarms, and potentially take over the control of the UAS and/or stop its ground operator without the use of kinetic measures.

Excerpt is from written testimony submitted to a Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hearing titled “S. 2836, the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018: Countering Malicious Drones” Release Date: June 6, 2018

Written testimony of I&A Under Secretary and OGC for a Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs hearing titled “S. 2836, the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018: Countering Malicious Drones”

Here are some more important passages:

DHS is in need of legislative authority to counter the growing threat posed by UAS. Specifically, DHS needs Counter-UAS (CUAS) authorities to detect, track, and mitigate threats from small UAS. Without this mandate, DHS is unable to develop and operate many types of CUAS technologies.

DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) need relief from Title 18 to allow us to use the most effective technology to counter the threat posed by UAS and to ensure that our law enforcement personnel are not criminally liable for using this technology.

What is Title 18 you ask? Literally every federal crime in the book:

https://uscode.house.gov/browse/prelim@title18/part1/chapter119&edition=prelim

Including the Wiretapping Law.

18 U.S. Code § 2511 - Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited

18 U.S. Code § 2512 - Manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertising of wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepting devices prohibited

18 U.S. Code § 2512 - Manufacture, distribution, possession, and advertising of wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepting devices prohibited

www.law.cornell.edu

Now back to the written testimony:

If enacted, S. 2836 would authorize DHS and DOJ to conduct limited CUAS operations to identify, track, and mitigate drone threats. These authorities would apply to a narrow set of important and prioritized missions, and it would allow DHS and DOJ to protect Americans and our own personnel who perform law enforcement and protective missions.

Somehow we went from narrow and prioritized mission to protect federal facilities to mission of mass surveillance of every drone flight in the country.

An example of a currently illegal, but highly effective technology is the ability to access signals being transmitted between a nefarious UAS and its ground controller to accurately geolocate and track both without false alarms, and potentially take over the control of the UAS and/or stop its ground operator without the use of kinetic measures.

The DHS Privacy Office and the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties will work with CUAS practitioners, as appropriate, to ensure compliance and oversight of any CUAS activities.

Notice that the program is dubbed Countering Malicious Drones. The program metastasized from narrow and prioritized mission to protect federal facilities from criminals to mission of mass surveillance of every drone flight in the country.

DHS wants public broadcast of unencrypted signal to avoid the federal wiretapping act. I bet a whole bunch of Aeroscopes and similar devices are being operated right now in blatant violation of state and federal law. At least that is what the federal government says.

 

[anotherlab]

I thought I was pushing it with you a little but had to try!

It doesn't hurt to try.?

I sincerely wish you the best of luck in pursuing this, I just don't believe that it will accomplish anything. EPIC tried twice using a privacy argument and their petitions were denied each time. (reference). Litigation is expensive and you should pick and choose your battles carefully.

 

[Chip]

EPIC tried twice using a privacy argument and their petitions were denied each time. (reference).

I agree with you the EPIC v FAA cases are important to know but not relevant to whether the FAA should now demand public broadcast of unencrypted signal so every drone pilot and every flight in the country may be tracked.

EPIC’s concern was and is primarily use of drones to conduct secret surveillance in violation of the Fourth Amendment. EPIC urged the FAA to "assess the privacy problems associated with the highly intrusive nature of drone aircraft, and the ability of operators to gain access to private areas and to track individuals over large distances."

The FAA argued that it has no obligation to consider or respect anybody's privacy because privacy has nothing to do with safety. Its a very clear message that everyone should read and understand.

The federal appellate court never reached the merits of the argument, however, because the cases were dismissed on technical grounds including lack of standing and missing filing deadline by one day. No doubt the FAA is immensely proud of their two EPIC wins but the rest of us should keep them in perspective.

My hunch is the standing problem is solved by having at least one drone owner as plaintiff as opposed to an organization like EPIC.

 

[DanMan32]

Claiming that 'encryption is a burden' is absurd. Encryption is publicly used everywhere quite easily.

The difference is that the key exchange is usually negotiated between two parties. The real problem is that an encrypted broadcast would require all those authorized to have the decryption key and that key could easily be compromised. It would be a challenge to have all transmitters be updated with a new key. If there was a two way communication then perhaps that could be fixed but we only have a one way broadcast.

It's like handcuff keys. Generally only LE have (or are supposed to have) them but they're probably universal so many outside of LE have them.

Gee, perhaps it is a burden to some extent, and mainly because of the one way broadcast.

 

[anotherlab]

Claiming that 'encryption is a burden' is absurd. Encryption is publicly used everywhere quite easily.

It's an easy problem to solve. The biggest "burden" is the server infrastructure to maintain a public/private key database.

The difference is that the key exchange is usually negotiated between two parties. The real problem is that an encrypted broadcast would require all those authorized to have the decryption key and that key could easily be compromised. It would be a challenge to have all transmitters be updated with a new key. If there was a two way communication then perhaps that could be fixed but we only have a one way broadcast.

You can solve this with multiple sets of keys and generous expiration dates. I suggested one way to handle this earlier in this thread. Assume that every key will be broken or leaked, but will expire.

Gee, perhaps it is a burden to some extent, and mainly because of the one way broadcast.

Shouldn't be a factor. The drone would encrypt with it's public key. LE would have the private key. Two way communication is not required.